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[Recently a German professor has advocated the adoption in this 
country of the German style of legal problem solving. Occasionally a 
German author attempts to civilise the common-law world using 
what is put forward as a more rational approach. But with such 
endeavours is usually associated a certain lack of self-critical 
reflection. In this instance an Australian author is able to draw on 
his studies in Germany to rectify the omission.  He shows that the 
problem-solving method in question conveys a false picture of the 
nature of legal problem solving and of the law itself, while not 
possessing the advantages claimed for it.] 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, Professor1 Lutz-Christian Wolff, currently of the City University of 
Hong Kong but qualified as a professor (according to the extremely 
demanding German requirements) in Passau, Germany, wrote in praise of the 
German problem-solving method.2 In his article, he referred to that method 
(as will I) as the ‘step-by-step’ method3 and explained its principal features 
well. Wolff’s article provides me, however, with a welcome opportunity to 
                                                 
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Monash University. The author wishes to thank 
Cornelia Koch, Professor Dr Lothar Kuhlen, Professor Horst Lücke, Dr Sabine 
Pittrof and Roland Raudies for their very useful criticisms of and suggestions on a 
draft of this piece. The views expressed here are, however, the author’s own. 
1 Professor Wolff is an außerplanmäßiger Professor at the University of Passau and 
accordingly entitled to the full professorial title. 
2 Lutz-Christian Wolff, Structured Problem Solving: German Methodology from a 
Comparative Perspective 14 Legal Education Review 19 (2004). 
3 Although that is not its German name. It is referred to there as the Gutachtenstil, the 
‘opinion style’ – ‘opinion’ in the non-American sense contrasted, not equated, with 
Court judgments. 
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write a short ‘counterblast’ based on my reflections on that method informed 
by my experiences as a law student in Germany when I was required to use 
that method in examinations – even if it must by necessity appear elsewhere, 
as the journal in which he published does not make a practice of publishing 
replies. I will argue, first, that the ‘step-by-step’ method does not possess the 
virtues which Wolff claims for it and, secondly, that, while it has one or two 
other virtues, it is in the final analysis a positively harmful method of 
problem solving. 
 
I cannot, of course, repeat here the detailed analysis of the ‘step-by-step’ 
method that Wolff puts forward. Those seeking full information about it 
should read his article. In summary, however, it involves (in civil law 
matters) the identification of the basis of a possible claim by the plaintiff, and 
then a listing of all the preconditions for making the claim together with an 
analysis of whether the legal prerequisites for the satisfaction of that claim 
have been fulfilled. This must, furthermore, be done in such a way that the 
answer does not appear until the end so that it appears that the answer 
emerges as the analysis progresses and is a result of applying the law to the 
facts rather than, perhaps, of instinct or prejudice divorced from the precise 
content of the law. It is a syllogistic style, or rather a style involving a series 
of syllogisms, in which the major premise is always a proposition of law, the 
minor premise a statement about the facts and their relation to the proposition 
of law in the major premise, and the conclusion a statement about whether 
the claim does or does not succeed. 
 
Wolff gives an example of problem solving using the method he advocates at 
pp. 30 –32 of his article. Because of its length, it cannot be reproduced here. 
In brief, it involves a contract between A and B for the sale of a painting 
called ‘Green Frog’ by A to B. A then assigns his rights under the contract to 
C, and advises B of that. C now wishes to enforce the contract against B. We 
are first asked, however, whether A has any remaining rights to enforce the 
contract against B. The answer to this is quite simple: no, because he has 
assigned them. Under the ‘step-by-step’ method, however, this cannot be 
simply stated; this is how it has to be solved: 
 
A could have lost his claim against B by way of assignment to C. 
Precondition for the effectiveness of such assignment would be that an 
assignment agreement has been concluded between A and C, Article 
398 of the German Civil Code. On 15 December A and C have agreed 
that all of A’s rights and claims arising out of the ‘Green Frog’ 
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contract shall be transferred to C. Therefore, they have concluded a 
valid assignment agreement. A has lost his claim against B to C.4 
 
The correct ‘step-by-step’ structure is followed here. There is a statement of 
the legal form in which the problem presents itself in the first sentence, 
always in the conditional form (‘could’) as we are not allowed to give away 
the answer until we have gone through the process prescribed by the method. 
Then the second sentence states the abstract proposition of law that governs 
the area. The third sentence is the minor premise, an extract from the facts 
that is relevant to applying the proposition of law in the major premise. 
Finally, there is the conclusion about the legal consequence that follows. 
 
The above is only a short extract from Wolff’s solution; the full solution to 
the ‘Green Frog’ problem involves a series of analyses on the pattern of that 
just quoted in order to deal with various aspects of the problem, such as 
whether the claim has been extinguished by lapse of time, whether indeed it 
existed in the first place and so on. Then the process has to be repeated for 
C’s claim against B, for so far we have been dealing only with A’s! 
 
The style advocated by Wolff is not, in its German home, merely a scheme to 
be used in planning examination answers or identifying the issues raised by 
problems. Nor is it just one way, or even merely the dominant way, of 
structuring students’ answers to problems in law examinations. It is, rather, 
the one and only approved way of answering examination problems. Every 
student must use the style outlined by Wolff in examination answers. A 
student who does not do so will fail, and even minor lapses from the 
approved style will lead to rude comments in the margin by the marker and to 
possible loss of marks. Although his article is not entirely unambiguous on 
this point, I take it that Wolff is advocating that the ‘step-by-step’ method 
should be adopted in the same capacity as it is in Germany: as the one and 
only approved means of answering examination problems. If it is to have that 
function, it had better be pretty good. My case will however be that, while it 
has some minor virtues, they are greatly outweighed by its defects. It should 
be considered, at most, a help for those who find it useful, not a compulsory 
structure to be used by everyone. 
 
 
                                                 
4See Wolff, above n 2, 30. 
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II VIRTUES OF THE METHOD 
 
What then are the virtues of the ‘step-by-step’ method? Somewhat 
surprisingly, in my view, Wolff claims that the chief virtue of the ‘step-by-
step’ method is the stereotypically Teutonic virtue of efficiency. Indeed, he 
praises the ‘step-by-step’ method at some length for its efficiency, claiming 
that efficiency is ‘the sole criterion’5 by which approaches to problem solving 
should be assessed, and that the ‘step-by-step’ method “embodies efficiency” 
because it requires “a minimum input of resources”. Accordingly, “[n]o more 
efficient way of problem solving is available”.6 This confirms Wolff’s rather 
Panglossian view that ‘[t]he general adoption of a specific method’ – for his 
method is indeed generally adopted in German law schools – “seems to 
indicate that this method is better than others’.7 
 
Let us therefore take the example Wolff gives and measure it against the 
criterion he sets up. An example of problem solving according to the ‘step-
by-step’ method used in German law schools may be found at pages 30–32 of 
his article. It will be seen at once by anyone who takes the trouble to read it 
that the problem-solving method advocated by Wolff requires a considerable 
waste of time and ink dealing with non-issues. This is because it requires the 
problem-solver to deal, step by step, with every single requirement for the 
creation of a valid contract and the assignment of obligations under it, even 
those that are not in the least doubtful. And, because there are two possible 
plaintiffs (A and C in his example), this has to be done not once, but twice. 
 
Thus, it is quite clear on the facts given in his example that A once had a 
contract with B, but has validly assigned it to C. The question is whether the 
non-performance by C of what were originally A’s obligations relieves B 
from performing his side of the bargain. But, under the ‘step-by-step’ 
method, this cannot simply be stated. It must be laboriously proved by means 
of showing that the requirements for the valid creation of the original contract 
were met (1 (b) in his example), followed by a demonstration that the 
assignment is valid (1 (c) – this is the extract quoted above). The process has 
then to be repeated for C’s possible claim against B (2 (b)). In 2 (c), the 
obvious fact that C has not done anything to extinguish his claim must be 
specially mentioned; there is not the remotest indication in the facts that C 
has done anything which could lead to the extinguishment of the claim, but if 
he had then of course he would have no claim, so that this negative 
                                                 
5 Ibid 33. 
6 Ibid 34. 
7 Ibid 33. 
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precondition to a successful claim by C cannot simply be passed over in 
silence, or else an essential step in the reasoning will have been missed. At 
last, under 2 (d), the real heart of the issue is reached: whether B is entitled to 
refuse performance until the assignee delivers. It is then concluded, with the 
degree of prolixity to which we are by now accustomed, that this is so. A 
simple problem which could have been solved in two or three lines – which 
concerned the ability to plead a contractual defence against an assignee as 
well as the assignor – has been turned into a novel because of the need, under 
the ‘step-by-step’ procedure, to show that one has checked every single 
requirement for the creation and enforceability of the claim, even those that 
are not controversial. 
 
This has to be done separately, as Wolff points out, not merely for each 
possible plaintiff, but for each possible claim of each possible plaintiff. Thus, 
if there are claims for damages and payment of the purchase price, the 
process has to be repeated separately for each, as “the preconditions for the 
payment of damages and for the payment of the purchase price may not be 
the same, and therefore a joint examination may cause confusion”.8 But, we 
may respond, they are nearly the same; it is a question of remedy only; and 
surely we are not so easily confused that we cannot deal with two remedies 
available to the one plaintiff at the one time (just as we also generally manage 
to walk and chew gum simultaneously). 
 
Could this lengthy procedure have some other advantage to recommend it? 
One German author says that an answer written using the ‘step-by-step’ 
method: 
 
[I]s to be written, as a rule, for someone who does not know the legal 
position, but needs to discover why the relevant legal question must be 
answered in the way suggested by the writer. The answer must 
therefore be understandable on its own even for a layperson who 
knows only the facts and the text of the law.9 
 
It has accordingly been suggested to me10 that the ‘step-by-step’ method 
might assist future lawyers to hone their communication skills with the lay 
public who will later be their clients and require the reasoning behind the 
lawyer’s answer to a legal problem to be explained to them. But such skills 
                                                 
8 Ibid 24. 
9 Gerhard Wolf, Bemerkungen zum Gutachtenstil [1996] Juristische Schulung 30, 
33f. 
10 By Cornelia Koch. See below n 11. 
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are not well taught by means of requiring them to be practised in 
examinations on the substantive law. Communication with clients is much 
more than, and very different from, just taking them through the steps 
involved in concluding that the law produces a particular result in their case. 
Apart from that alleged advantage, there is no reason at all to proceed as if 
one were explaining the answer to a layperson. 
 
As Wolff’s example shows, if the ‘step-by-step’ method has a virtue, it is not 
efficiency – for the reasons given, it is one of the most egregiously inefficient 
methods for answering questions that could possibly be devised – but the 
equally stereotypically Teutonic virtue of thoroughness. The advantages of 
thoroughness are not to be underestimated, especially for students, such as 
those in their first years of law, who might otherwise overlook a particular 
issue. The question is whether this virtue is purchased at too high a cost. It is 
my case that it is. 
 
First, of course, thoroughness is a doubled-edged sword. A problem-solving 
method that may help first-year students to ensure that they do not miss 
anything important is not necessarily appropriate for later-year students who, 
one might hope, have managed to get over the teething problems of the first 
couple of weeks of law studies.11 On the other hand, the ‘step-by-step’ 
method does not – no method could – absolutely guarantee that nothing will 
be missed out: it is always possible that a student will entirely fail to see that 
a problem raises a particular type of legal norm, or legal institution (such as 
unjust enrichment as well as contract) or defence (such as expiry of the 
limitation period) and thus fail to consider the issue concerned. So we should 
not overestimate the extent to which the ‘step-by-step’ method promotes the 
virtue of thoroughness. The great waste of time and effort which it requires in 
the consideration of things which are not controversial also means that 
students may run out of time, panic and forget something, or simply not have 
time to reach the real issues in the case after dealing with the non-issues. 
                                                 
11 Cornelia Koch acutely observes (in an e-mail to me) that my view 
that the problem-solving method might aid first-year students, but is unsuitable for 
later-year students, is really seen in an Australian context. In Australia, she 
continues, problems do not become much more complex from first to final year. Only 
the area of law changes. Students are rarely required to make connections between 
different subject areas. In Germany, on the other hand, problems become a lot more 
complex as the students progress (as there is a state-run examination at the end of 
studies on all areas of law) and, therefore, a method like that advocated by Wolff is a 
suitable aid to deal with such problems. This may well be something in this, but of 
course this view, if accurate, does not make the ‘step-by-step’ method more suitable 
for Australian conditions. 
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It may be, as Wolff claims to know from anecdotal evidence, that ‘common-
law lawyers normally confirm that the ‘step-by-step’ method is exactly how 
they would approach the legal analysis of a private-law problem’.12 Possibly 
this is often so, both for academics and for practising lawyers. Having some 
acquaintance with the German gift for systematic, thorough and well-
structured legal thinking, I can say that it has certainly helped me as an 
academic. Nor have I any wish to advocate that students should not attempt 
to write well-structured examination answers. Practitioners no doubt try to 
proceed step-by-step as well. A barrister asked to advise, for example, on a 
question of frustration in contract law would, one might hope, first check that 
there was in fact a valid contract in the first place. The barrister would be 
expected to ensure that there was consideration, no vitiating factors, no 
breaches of the Statute of Frauds, and so on. But the ‘step-by-step’ method 
goes well beyond merely providing a general structure for examination 
answers or opinions, or reminding us to proceed in a logical order. A barrister 
might well use something like a ‘step-by-step’ approach in deciding what the 
issues are in the case, but would not burden his or her actual opinion with an 
elaborate demonstration that the contract is valid and enforceable if, having 
carried out these basic checks, there is no real issue about any of them; still 
less would a barrister use in an opinion the highly manneristic formula of the 
‘step-by-step’ method which Wolff reproduces in his article. Nor should a 
student be expected to deal at length, or at all, with non-issues. The ‘step-by-
step’ method, in other words, elevates a handy checklist procedure, useful in 
planning one’s answer to a problem and deciding what the real issues are, far 
beyond its station. 
 
So the virtues of the ‘step-by-step’ method are partly chimerical, and partly 
exaggerated. I will now consider the disadvantages of the ‘step-by-step’ 
method. 
 
III DISADVANTAGES OF THE METHOD 
 
First, the ‘step-by-step’ – at least in its German home, and in the form 
advocated by Wolff – places far too much emphasis on questions of form 
rather than content. The chief reason for this is that, as Wolff points out,13 it 
proceeds on the assumption that the writer starts with an open mind about the 
outcome and proceeds through the relevant legal requirements, considering 
whether each is satisfied, until a conclusion can be reached, and that the 
                                                 
12 See Wolff, above n 2, 49. 
13 Ibid 28. 
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conclusion is not known until the end of the analysis.14 Thus, any language 
that appears to suggest that the problem-solver might know the outcome 
before the end is reached must be avoided. Thus, as Wolff points out: 
 
[T]he legal analysis of a problem can never start out with the final 
result. On the contrary, the final result must be developed step-by-step. 
German legal education emphasises that the language used by law 
students should reflect such step-by-step verification of an initial 
hypothesis by using the conditional form.15 
 
As an empirical proposition, the assumption that the result is never known 
until the end of legal analysis is, of course, entirely false. Better law students 
will be able to develop an instinct for the solution to many legal problems 
before even putting pen to paper. Not only is the assumption false as a matter 
of fact; it would be undesirable if students proceeded in that way. We should 
encourage students to work out the solution to which they will come before 
they start writing, as that will lead to better planned answers, rather than let 
them think that they should start writing first and come up with the solution 
as they go along. 
 
Even leaving aside, however, the empirical falsity and pedagogical 
undesirability of its starting point, the ‘step-by-step’ method also requires 
students to use a prescribed structure and form of language reflecting the 
hypothesis that they do not know the answer until the end. This applies to the 
answer to the question as a whole, but also to each sub-issue within the 
problem (even the uncontroversial ones). What this looks like can be seen, in 
English translation, in Wolff’s example at pp 30 – 32 of his article. Part 1 
accordingly starts off with the statement that A could have a claim based on a 
particular paragraph of the Civil Code, and ends with a conclusion that A has 
no claim; the same procedure is followed in Part 2 for C’s claim. Within each 
part, each sub-heading repeats the process of hypothesising that a particular 
state of affairs might be true and considering whether it is by means of a 
more or less syllogistic procedure in which a proposition of law is the major 
premise and the relevant fact is the minor premise. Only then can a 
conclusion on each sub-issue be stated. 
 
                                                 
14 Christian Fahl, Bemerkungen zum Urteilsstil [1996] Juristische Schulung 280, 280; 
Dieter Schmalz, Methodenlehre für das juristische Studium (4th ed., Nomos, Baden 
Baden 1998), pp. 156, 158; Wolf, [1996] Juristische Schulung 30, 30. 
15 See Wolff, above n 2, 28. 
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Heaven forbid that the student should say straight away that ‘A clearly 
concluded a valid contract with B, and has equally clearly assigned his rights 
under it to C’! This would be ‘wrong’, because it does not follow the 
prescribed syllogistic procedure of starting off with a question rather than a 
conclusion and then stating the law as the major premise and the relevant fact 
as the minor premise. A student who went straight to the conclusion would 
find a rude note from the marker in the margin of the script accusing the 
student of using the style appropriate to Court judgments (when the Judge 
already knows the answer in advance, according to this peculiar theory, and 
can write accordingly) rather than to student answers to examination 
questions (in which the theory is that the answer is not known until the end of 
the step-by-step analysis). 
 
That being so, a vast quantity of effort has to be devoted by the student to 
learning this style and then, under the stress of examination conditions, 
ensuring that it is adhered to. One must always pay attention to ensure that 
one both adheres to the syllogistic form and also does not slip into the natural 
habit of betraying the solution to the problem before reaching the very end of 
the analysis. To assist students not to make an error, books of advice are 
written about how to comply with the required style. Debates are conducted 
in learned journals about whether a particular form of language or even 
particular words (‘because’ or ‘therefore’, for example) are suitable for use 
by students in examination answers, and to what extent short cuts are 
permissible especially in later-year examinations when the answer to a 
particular sub-problem is not controversial.16 This is a gigantic waste of effort 
(and the discussion about permissible short-cuts makes one wonder what the 
point of the whole procedure is anyway if it can be modified in later-year 
examinations in relation to non-controversial issues). In the end, who cares 
what words are used? 
 
Admittedly, some students manage all this almost effortlessly – as a student 
in Germany, I did not find it particularly hard, partly because I was watching 
my language anyway as a non-native speaker – but others have terrible 
difficulty with it, and I know people who have withdrawn from law studies 
partly because of it. 
 
 
                                                 
16 See, eg, Fahl, [1996] Juristische Schulung 280, 280; Schmalz, Methodenlehre, p. 
156; Wolf, [1996] Juristische Schulung 30, 31. 
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IV A FALSE PICTURE OF THE NATURE OF LEGAL PROBLEM-SOLVING 
 
The most objectionable features of the ‘step-by-step’ method are not, 
however, those already mentioned. Nor is it the fact that law students are 
required to write in a completely uniform style – a requirement which 
unfairly advantages those who are able to master its peculiarities at the 
expense of permitting a diversity of styles and approaches suiting a diversity 
of temperaments.17 It is rather the basically incorrect assumptions about the 
nature of legal thought that the method involves. 
 
It will be seen from Wolff’s example that the ‘step-by-step’ method proceeds 
by stating, first, that a possible legal consequence might ensue from a set of 
facts; secondly, by stating what rule governs that consequence; thirdly, 
applying the rule to the facts; and, finally, reaching a conclusion. This 
syllogistic procedure is quite appropriate for the sort of problems one might 
encounter in one’s first weeks of law study. We all know the type. In contract 
law, they are problems along the following lines: ‘A sends a letter to B 
offering to sell A’s library for £100; B posts a letter by return accepting the 
offer, but before A receives the letter, A sends a telegram retracting the offer. 
Is there a valid contract?’ (A always sends a telegram – rather than an e-mail 
or an SMS – because the problem has been passed down through the 
generations and is at least a hundred years old.) The ‘step-by-step’ method 
might well be quite appropriate at this stage of one’s studies for a number of 
reasons: the simplicity of the problem and of the rules it involves; the need 
for practice in the application of rules even to non-controversial facts; and the 
law student’s limited degree of appreciation of the way in which the law 
works and need for guidance in problem solving. Using something like the 
‘step-by-step’ method in solving what might be called ‘kindergarten’ 
problems also helps to take the law student through the concepts of 
consideration and intention to create legal relations even though they are not 
of course in question in the problem. 
 
Pretty soon, however, the brighter students realise – and eventually, it might 
be hoped, everyone realises – that most legal problem-solving is rarely as 
straightforward as it was in the first Contract tutorial: know the rule, apply it 
to the facts, get a clear simple answer. Continuing on the voyage through 
contract law, for example, the student comes to the doctrine of frustration, 
and immediately faces the problem that the rule itself cannot be stated with 
any degree of certainty, let alone applied to the facts in a mechanical way. 
                                                 
17 Bernhard Großfeld, Examensvorbereitung und Jurisprudenz [1992] Juristenzeitung 
22, 25-27. 
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And it just gets harder as we deal with more difficult subjects such as Torts 
or Constitutional Law. 
 
The ‘step-by-step’ method assumes, however, that the process of applying the 
law to the facts is a simple syllogistic procedure involving stating the 
applicable rule and then applying the facts to it. This is an assumption which 
is left over from the eighteenth century (or earlier),18 when it was thought 
possible to state the law with complete exactitude in a code and then simply 
apply it as cases cropped up19 and when Montesquieu wrote that ‘the national 
judges are not more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, 
mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigour’.20 
 
Because it proceeds by breaking down each legal question into a series of 
smaller and smaller sub-questions, it is also very strongly reminiscent of the 
Begriffsjurisprudenz (‘conceptual jurisprudence’) current in about the same 
period (and influential in various guises even into the twentieth century)21 
with its belief in ‘a pyramid of concepts structured according to the rules of 
formal logic’.22 As Professor Donald Kommers points out, the style and basic 
assumptions of Begriffsjurisprudenz differ greatly from those of the common 
law. The emphasis of Begriffsjurisprudenz is on ‘the idea of a Court – an 
autonomous legal institution – entrusted with the systematic if not the 
mechanical application of fixed rules of law’.23 
                                                 
18 In fact, it may be that the “step-by-step” method goes back to the Roman or 
mediaeval practice of sending cases to learned lawyers for opinions (Hermann 
Lange, Das Rechtsgutachten im Wandel der Geschichte [1969] Juristenzeitung 157). 
In Germany it can be traced, on the written records, back to the 1830s: Filippo 
Ranieri, ‘Stilus Curiae: Zum historischen Hintergrund der Relationstechnik’ (1985) 4 
Rechtshistorisches Journal 75, 85).  It is however certainly older than Wolff might be 
thought to be implying (see Wolff, above n 2, 22), as it was definitely in use in the 
decade after the Second World War (personal discussion with Professor Horst 
Lücke). 
19 Martin Kriele, Theorie der Rechtsgewinnung, dargestellt am Problem der 
Verfassungsinterpretation (2nd ed; 1976) 60-63. 
20 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws (1751). 
21 See Stanley Paulson, The Theory of Public Law in Germany 1914 – 1945 (2005) 
25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 525, 528-530, 535-537. 
22 Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1991), p. 21; see also at 21-
24; Ranieri, Rechtshistorisches Journal 4 (1985), 75, 77. An interesting and 
perceptive overview may be found in Stefan Vogenauer, An Empire of Light? 
Learning and Lawmaking in the History of German Law [2005] Cambridge Law 
Journal 481, 485-500. 
23 Donald Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (1997) 40. Further discussion by Professor Kommers of this tradition will 
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Now this is certainly not the place to get into philosophical debates about the 
nature of law, legal rules and so on, but it is certainly true to say that no-one 
today would consider the assumptions on which Begriffsjurisprudenz and its 
child, the ‘step-by-step’ method, are based to be an adequate description of 
how the law either actually is or even necessarily should be. One need only 
think again of the doctrine of frustration for an example of a legal concept 
which is a series of illustrations supported by a common theme rather than a 
rule that can be neatly stated as the major premise in the ‘step-by-step’ 
method’s syllogistic manner. Furthermore, we all know now that rules are 
never entirely cut and dried, that their application can never be a value-free 
process, and that sometimes rules run out so that we have to resort to broader 
principles (if such exist), conceptions of justice, and/or our legal instinct.24 
But the underlying assumption on which the ‘step-by-step’ method is based is 
that the law is a system of rules that can be simply stated as the major 
premise in a syllogism. This is a simplistic model of the manner in which the 
law works which has not been current for a hundred years or so. 
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
Perhaps things are different in a jurisdiction, such as Germany, in which the 
law is codified? (I should be happier with the proposition that the law in 
Germany claims to be codified, as any glance at the commentaries will 
indicate how much case law and interpretation are required to make sense of 
the codes, but leave that aside.) No, there too many authors on legal 
methodology have long been attacking the idea that the law is a simple 
process of applying rules to facts.25 As Professor Karl Larenz, for example, 
writes, ‘The assignment of a state of affairs to a category or to the area of 
operation of a standard in need of interpretation is not a process of syllogistic 
logic but a value-laden characterisation’.26 
 
                                                                                                                    
be contained in Kommers, Constitutional Interpretation in Germany: Balancing 
Rights and Duties in Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed.), Constitutional Interpretation: A 
Comparative Study (forthcoming 2006). 
24 Opinions differ, of course, on the degree to which such statements are true, and 
this author would be at the more conservative end of the spectrum; but no-one would 
deny that often there is a great deal of value-laden judgment involved in formulating 
and applying rules. 
25 Larenz, Methodenlehre, 166; Günter Stratenwerth/Lothar Kuhlen, Strafrecht 
Allgemeiner Teil (5th ed; 2004) 50. 
26 Larenz, Methodenlehre, 275. 
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This is not new or surprising, and it is not my intention to collect a large 
number of quotations from German authors saying similar things to 
commonplaces long since current in the English-speaking world as well. It is 
merely necessary to demonstrate that the existence of what claim to be 
codifications of the law does not make much difference to the degree of 
uncertainty involved in first ascertaining legal rules or principles and then 
applying them to the facts. 
 
That process is one which the syllogistic procedure of the ‘step-by-step’ 
method conceals, because of its assumption that the law consists of rules 
which can be stated in a few words as the major premise in a syllogism and 
then automatically applied to facts in a mechanical fashion – rather than a 
value-laden system involving judgment (in the broadest sense of the word) as 
well as applying rules to facts. Its misleading conception of how the law 
works, even more than the vast waste of time and effort that it involves, is 
why it should not be foisted upon law students in this or any other country. 
 
 
 
 
